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Abstract 
An emerging literature in psychology and political science has identified political identity 
as an important driver of political decisions. However, less is known about how a person’s 
political identity is incorporated into their broader self-concept and why it influences some 
people more than others. We examined the role of political identity in representations of the self-
concept as one determinant of people’s political behaviors. We tested the predictions of a recent 
theoretical account of self-concept representation that, inspired by work on conceptual 
representation, emphasizes the role of causal beliefs. This account predicts that people who 
believe that their political identity is causally central (linked to many other features of the self-
concept) will be more likely to engage in behaviors consistent with their political identity than 
those who believe that the same aspect is causally peripheral (linked to fewer other features). 
Consistent with these predictions, in a study run when political identity was particularly salient—
during the 2016 U.S. Presidential election—we found that U.S. voters who believed their 
political party identity was more causally central (vs those who believe it was causally 
peripheral) were more likely to vote for their political party’s candidate. Further, in 2 studies, we 
found that U.K. residents who believed that their English or British national identity was more 
causally central were more likely to support the U.K. leaving the European Union (Brexit) than 
those who believed the same identities were more causally peripheral. 
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1. Introduction 
Recent research on political thought and behavior has challenged the foundational 
assumption of rational decision-making models, that political beliefs and behaviors are mainly 
driven by self-interest—i.e., that people vote for the candidate that provides them with the most 
economic benefit (Downs, 1957; Laver, 1981) or for the candidate that best matches their views 
on important issues (Page, 1977). In this recent research (reviewed in Mason, 2018), political 
identity, or partisanship, has emerged as a key driver of political thought and behavior. Party 
affiliation has been found to have a greater effect on policy preferences and voting behavior than 
self-interest measures (Sears, Lau, Tyler, & Allen, 1980; Sears & Funk, 1990) and personal 
political ideology (Cohen, 2003). 
A large body of literature in political science and both political and social psychology 
cites political identity (political party) as a key driver of a wide range of political attitudes and 
activities (Bartels, 2000; Campbell et al., 1960; Carsey & Layman, 2006; Gaines et al., 2007; 
Gerber et al., 2010; Greene, 2004; Van Bavel & Pereira, 2018). This work has documented a 
causal relationship between partisanship and both voting behavior and evaluations of political 
figures (Gerber et al., 2010), as well as systematic differences in how Democrats and 
Republicans make political predictions (Granberg & Brent, 1983; Orhun & Urminsky, 2011) and 
interpret factual information regarding political issues (despite agreement on what the facts are, 
Gaines et al., 2007). Further, political identity has been found to influence the more basic 
cognitive processes that underlie political thought like memory, attention, and even visual 
perception (Caruso et al., 2007; Castelli & Carro, 2011; Van Bavel & Pereira, 2018). 
Given how influential partisanship is on political thought and behavior, it is perhaps 
surprising that less attention has been paid to the cognitive underpinnings of political identity 
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itself. Political scientists have noted variance in whether members of a given political party act in 
ways consistent with the party, and have found that political identity may conflict with other 
aspects of one’s self-concept (e.g., gender, race, age, religion, etc., Mason, 2018). However, 
research has not focused on why such differences exist and how political identity fits into the 
broader self-concept. Our aim is to build on established cognitive principles, primarily research 
on conceptual and self-concept representation, to provide a psychological explanation for 
political identity as a potentially important part of the self-concept. This approach provides a 
generative framework that can predict who is more and less likely to act in ways consistent with 
their political identity. 
1.1 Categorization and causal centrality 
In this paper, we build on a recent theoretical account of self-concept representation 
(Chen, Urminsky, & Bartels, 2016) to generate testable predictions of people’s likelihood of 
engaging in behaviors consistent with their political party. This account suggests that people who 
believe that their political identity is causally central—causally related to more other features of 
their self-concept—will be more likely to act in ways consistent with the norms of that identity 
than those who believe their political identity is relatively casually peripheral (i.e., having 
relatively fewer causal connections). 
This cognitive approach to understanding political identity is based on the importance of 
people’s causal knowledge and their beliefs in conceptual representation and learning. A seminal 
finding in this area is that a feature of a concept is seen as defining of that concept and important 
to categorization judgments to the extent that the feature is perceived as casually central (Ahn et 
al., 2000; Rehder & Hastie, 2001; Rehder, 2003; Sloman et al., 1998). That is, items missing 
causally central features of a category are seen are less likely to belong to that category and less 
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typical of that category than items missing causally peripheral features (Ahn et al., 2000; Rehder 
& Hastie, 2001). 
Many explorations of the self-concept have taken a feature-based approach, assuming 
that there is a type of feature that is more defining of the self-concept. In particular, mirroring the 
debate about what underlies political reasoning, some researchers have argued that moral 
principles are most defining of personal identity (Strohminger & Nichols, 2014, 2015), while 
others have suggests that memories define an individual (Blok, Newman, & Rips, 2005; Nichols 
& Bruno, 2010). In contrast, Chen et al. (2016) proposed that causal beliefs about the 
relationships between these features play a critical role in determining what defines the self-
concept, such that the importance of any type of feature is, at least in part, determined by the 
causal relationships that it is involved in. 
Chen et al. (2016) had participants report the cause-effect relationships that they believed 
existed between different aspects of their self-concept and calculated the causal centrality of a 
feature in a manner consistent with Rehder and Hastie’s (2001) relational centrality hypothesis, 
which proposes that a feature is causally central to a concept to the extent that it participates in 
many causal relationships. Thus, a feature’s causal centrality was calculated by summing the 
number of other features a given feature was causally linked to, as either a cause or an effect. 
This measure is similar to “degree centrality” in social network analysis (Freeman, 1978), as it is 
the number of direct links that a node has. However, unlike in social network analysis, the 
“nodes” here represent different aspects of the self-concept (e.g., political party, gender, etc.)  
Furthermore, the links are not simply associative, but more specifically represent a belief that 
one feature influenced or shaped the other.  
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If causally central features are perceived as more defining of the self-concept, then 
changes to these features would make people perceive more disruption to the continuity of their 
identity. That is indeed what was found— people reported that changes to more causally central 
features would make them into more of a different person than changes to more peripheral 
features. Further, across a range of feature types (morals qualities, memories, preferences, and 
personality traits), participants perceived that changing a feature would be more disruptive of 
another person’s self-concept when that feature was manipulated to be causally central than 
when the exact same feature was manipulated to be causally peripheral. 
Chen et al. (2016) also examined another theoretical model of causal centrality, the 
causal status hypothesis (Ahn et al., 2000) and its computational implementation, the 
dependency model (Sloman, Ahn, & Love, 1998). Unlike the relational centrality hypothesis, 
according to which a feature can be causally central by having many causes or effects, according 
to the dependency model, features are central to a concept to the extent that they have many 
effects (both direct and indirect) and the deeper a cause is in the causal chain, the more defining 
it will be of a concept. Chen et al. (2016) found that the dependency model did predict some 
identity judgments, but not as consistently as the relational centrality hypothesis. Thus, we will 
focus on relational centrality. However, as this paper explores causal centrality in a new context 
(behaviors rather than categorization of identity judgments), we will re-examine the dependency 
model in the final study (study 2b). 
1.2 The causal centrality of political identity. 
To illustrate how causal centrality influences beliefs about what is defining of the self-
concept, imagine two Democrats who are academics, Anna and Alex. Anna believes that it is her 
moral qualities that caused her to become a Democrat and also caused her to choose her 
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profession as an academic. Alex instead believes that it is being a Democrat that has caused him 
to develop his moral qualities and also caused him to choose his profession. As a result, even 
though Anna and Alex’s profession, moral qualities, and political affiliation are identical, their 
self-concepts will be fundamentally different. 
Moral qualities will be more causally central to Anna’s self-concept than to Alex’s, 
because she believes that her morals are causally connected to both her profession and political 
affiliation while Alex believes that his morals are only causally connected to his political 
affiliation. In contrast, Alex’s political affiliation will be relatively more central, because he 
believes that it is causally connected to both his profession and moral qualities, while Anna 
believes that her political affiliation is only causally connected to her moral qualities. As a result, 
Alex would experience a change in political affiliation as more disruptive to his self-concept than 
Anna would. 
The research on causal centrality in self-conceptual representation thus far—much like 
research on conceptual representation, in general—has focused on categorization judgments (i.e., 
after a change, is the resulting individual still an instance of me?). However, our goal in this 
paper is to extend this literature by examining whether people’s representations of the self-
concept are informative about their political thought and behavior. As causally central aspects 
are perceived to be more defining of the self-concept, political identity may have a stronger 
relationship with behaviors among people for whom that political identity is more causally 
central, compared to people for whom the political identity is more causally peripheral.  
Returning to the example, our account predicts that Alex, for whom political party is 
more causally central, would be more likely to vote for the Democratic candidate than Anna 
would be, even though both are self-ascribed Democrats. This prediction is consistent with 
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recent research in political science and social psychology, which finds that people who more 
strongly identify with a political party are more likely to hold beliefs and act in ways consistent 
with their party (Greene, 2004; Huddy, Mason, & Aaroe, 2015) and that people are more 
motivated to act in ways consistent with social categories that they see as important to their self-
concept (LeBeouf, Shafir, & Bayuk, 2010; Markus & Wurf, 1987; Reed II, 2004). While these 
previous findings identify a link between identity, including political identity, and behavior, they 
provide little theoretical insight into what it means for an identity to be important to the self-
concept. Our approach provides a testable psychological explanation, based on a large literature 
on conceptual representation, for why an aspect of the self-concept might be important to a given 
person for decision-making and behavior. 
Further, our exploration of causal centrality in the domain of the self-concept provides a 
unique opportunity to test for a relationship between causal centrality and decision-making. 
Work on concepts and decision making has largely focused on how our concepts influence 
behaviors indirectly via inference (e.g., Chen, Ross, & Murphy, 2014a, 2014b; Murphy, 2002; 
Ross, 1997). For example, we behave differently towards a person who we categorize as having 
measles than one we categorize as having sun poisoning because, based on what we know about 
these two categories, we infer that a person with measles is contagious while one with sun 
poisoning is not.  
That is, causal centrality is only related to behavior indirectly, via the categorization and 
category-based induction process. Knowing about the causal centrality of a given feature (e.g., 
fever) in the two categories determines how likely we are to categorize a person with that feature 
as having the measles or sun poisoning. Then, once the categorization is made, it supports 
predictions that determine how we interact with the person (e.g., avoid if he has measles or be 
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nice if he has sun poisoning). However, in our account of the self-concept, as causal centrality 
determines what is important to the self-concept, it is the causal centrality of the feature itself 
that predicts behavior. 
In the following experiments, we directly tested whether differences in the causal 
centrality of a shared political identity predict differences in political attitudes and behaviors. In 
Study 1, we test whether U.S. voters who perceive their political party as more causally central 
are more likely to vote for their party’s candidate, potentially over and above their ideological 
views. Political scientists have noted that other social identities, beyond party affiliation, often 
become part of how people organize their political views (e.g., age, race, religion, socio-
economic classes; Mason, 2018). Accordingly, in Studies 2a and 2b, we examine whether the 
causal centrality of another social identity, national identity, predicts support for and voting for a 
related political policy among residents of the United Kingdom, Brexit. Further, in Study 2b we 
test the predictive power of two different models of causal centrality from the conceptual 
representation literature, the relational centrality hypothesis (Rehder & Hastie, 2001) and the 
causal status hypothesis (Ahn et al., 2000) implemented with the dependency model (Sloman et 
al., 1998). 
These studies provide an initial test of whether causal centrality, which has been studied 
in terms of conceptual representation, connects to behaviors outside of categorization judgments 
and category learning, and helps explain identity-related real-world behavior. In doing so, we 
bridge research on cognitive representation and research on political behavior, and address calls 
to push research on basic cognition and cognitive representation into new areas to better 
understand when and to what degree known cognitive processes are at work (Bartels & Johnson, 
2015; Murphy, 2003). 
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2. Study 1 
To test our hypothesis that people who see their political identity as more causally central 
will be more likely to vote with their party, as part of a larger study of the psychological process 
underlying voting, we fielded a two-stage study at a time when political identity was very salient, 
during the 2016 U.S. Presidential election. The day before the election, participants completed 
the first wave, in which they reported the cause-effect relationships that they believed existed 
between various features of their self-concept, including their political identity (political party 
affiliation). From this survey, we calculated the causal centrality of their political party in a 
manner consistent with Rehder and Hastie’s (2001) relational centrality hypothesis: the number 
of cause-effect relationships that political party participated in with the other features of the self-
concept, either as the cause or as the effect. 
The day after the election, participants completed the second wave of the study, in which 
they reported whether they had voted in the election, which candidate they voted for, and how 
satisfied they were with their party’s nominee (Clinton or Trump). 
2.1 Method 
2.1.1 Participants. Four hundred eleven U.S. Amazon Mechanical Turk participants completed 
the first wave of a larger study the day before the 2016 U.S. presidential election (November 7, 
2016). Of the participants who completed the first wave, 355 participants (86%) completed the 
second wave, which was launched the day after the election. Of those 355 participants, 166 
reported being affiliated with the Democratic party and 77 reported being affiliated with the 
Republican party. Participants who reported being affiliated with one of these two parties had a 
relevant political identity and were therefore included in the analyses (n = 243).  Full stimuli are 
provided via OSF. 
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2.1.2 Procedure. In the first wave, participants first answered questions about their demographics 
(gender, ethnicity, political ideology, political party, religion, income category, and education 
level). Then participants answered questions about the features of their political identity. For the 
sake of generality, participants were randomly assigned to one of two sources for the features: 
either self-generated or experimenter-defined. The self-generated group was asked—in an open-
ended question—to list eight different aspects of their political identity. The experimenter-
defined group reported their position on eight major political issues (abortion, gun control, 
immigration, taxes, gay marriage, military spending, social programs, and marijuana 
legalization). 
To measure causal centrality, we had participants perform an adapted version of the 
“listing causal relationships” task from Chen et al. (2016), in which participants are asked to 
indicate which self-concept features have caused which other self-concept features. This task 
involved a set of 20 items: their political party and the six other demographic features and eight 
features of their political identity listed above, as well as five additional features that have been 
found to be important in prior research (Chen et al., 2016; Strohminger & Nichols, 2014): 
childhood memories, personal life goals, friendships, personal values and principles, and 
personality.  
Participants completed one trial for each feature, in which that feature was the target 
(e.g., in Figure 1, “being a Democrat” is the target feature). Participants saw the target feature at 
the top of the screen (along with the question text) and all of the other features, with check 
boxes, listed under it. In each trial, participants were asked to select all of the other features in 
the list that they thought were caused by the target feature. They also had the option, at the 
bottom of the list, to select “None of these are caused by my: [target feature]”. Participants could 
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check as many options as they wanted (unless they checked the None option). People were 
randomly assigned to one of three orders, such that they saw the demographic features, including 
political party, either at the beginning, middle, or end of the list (see Appendix A for details). 
Political party appeared as either as the 4th, 9th, or 12th feature in the list. 
 
 
Fig 1. Example trial of “listing causal relationships” task. 
From this series of questions, we calculated the causal centrality of each feature—the 
total number of causal relationships that feature is involved in, as either a cause or as an effect. 
More specifically, on the trial in which the feature was a target feature, the number of selected 
features on that trial measures the number of causal relationship in which the target feature is the 
cause. The number of causal links that the feature participated in as an effect is calculated based 
on the number of times it was selected from the list of features in all the other trials, in which 
other features were the target. The sum of the number of links in which that feature was a cause 
and the number of links for which the feature was an effect provides us the total number of 
causal links a feature participated in. 
After completing the “listing causal relationships” task, participants reported which 
Think	about	you:	being	a	Democrat	
Which	of	the	other	features	of	your	personal	iden ty	listed	below,	
if	any,	are	caused	by	you:	being	a	Democrat?	
	
You	may	select	as	many	or	as	few	features	as	you	see	fit.	In	the	
below	list,	please	select	all	the	feature	that	you	believe	are	caused	
by	the	above	feature.	
Being	female	
Being	pro	gun	control	
Being	pro-choice	
Being	a	college	graduate	
None	of	these	are	caused	by	me:	being	a	Democrat	
.	
.	
.	
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candidate they supported and both their economic and social ideology (1 = very liberal, 7 = very 
conservative). We computed an ideology index by averaging the separate ratings of economic 
and social ideology. 
The day after the general election, participants reported whether they had voted in the 
election, which candidate they voted for, how satisfied they were that their party had nominated 
Clinton or Trump, how they felt about the outcome of the election (happy vs. unhappy, and 
afraid vs. hopeful), and how involved they thought they would be in future politics. Our 
dependent measure was whether or not participants voted with their party. We predicted that 
participants for whom being a Republican or Democrat was relatively more causally central 
would be more likely to vote for their party’s candidate than those for whom the political party 
identity was more causally peripheral. 
2.2 Results 
2.2.1 Preliminary Analysis. There was no difference in the number of links reported for 
political party depending on its position on the list of features in the causal relationships task 
(M4th = 8.67, M9th = 8.26, M12th = 8.91, ts < 0.6, ps > .50). The position of political party (whether 
political party was presented 4th, 9th, or 12th on the feature list) also was not a significant 
predictor of voting behavior, so we collapse across order in our analyses (see Appendix A for a 
regression that controls for position of political party). 
Participants reported significantly more links to political party when they self-generated 
the features of their political identity (M = 9.92) than among the group who evaluated 
experimenter-defined features (M = 7.53), t(241) = 2.71, p < .001, 95% CI = [0.65, 4.12]. This 
does not seem to be specific to political identity, as we observe similar differences in the total 
number of links between those evaluating self-generated features (M = 156.04) vs. experimenter-
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defined features (M = 111.97), t(241) = 3.67, p < .001, 95% CI = [20.44, 67.70]. Because of 
these differences we controlled for the survey version (experimenter-defined vs. participant-
generated features) in the regression analyses reported below that use causal centrality to predict 
voting behavior. No other effects of survey version were found. 
2.2.2 Voting Behavior. Our sample consisted of 77 Republicans and 166 Democrats. The 
majority of these participants (who all had reported one of the two party affiliations) reported 
that they had voted in the election (Democrats: 92%; Republicans: 95%) and that they had voted 
for the candidate that their party nominated (Democrats: 89%; Republicans: 71%). 
We fit a logistic regression predicting whether participants voted with their party based 
on causal centrality of political party (the number of causal links political party had to other 
features), controlling for total number of links reported (among all features), survey version 
(experimenter defined vs. self-generated features), and party (Democrat vs. Republican). As 
predicted, participants who perceived their political party as more causally central prior to the 
election were more likely to report having voted for their party’s candidate after the election (B = 
.15, Wald χ2(1) = 8.95, p < .01) than those who had previously perceived their party to be more 
causally peripheral. We also found a main effect of party such that Democrats were significantly 
more likely to vote with their party. There was no significant relationship between voting and 
either survey version or total number of links reported (see Table 1 for detailed regression 
results). Because this regression controls for the total number of links, the effect is specific to 
political identity, as opposed to other factors such as having a more integrated identity in general, 
or a more conscientious survey response style. 
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Table 1. 
 
Study 1 logistic regression predicting voting for candidate of one’s political party 
 
Factor Beta SE Wald p 
Constant 2.56 .64 16.02 <.001 
Political party causal centrality .15 .05 8.95 .003 
Total number of links -.01 .00 3.56 .059 
Political Party -1.03 .37 7.94 .005 
Survey version .52 .39 1.78 .182 
*Coding of variables is as follows 
Voting: 1 = did not vote with party, 2 = voted with party 
Political party: 1 = Democrat, 2 = Republican 
Survey version: 0 = experimenter-defined, 1 = self-generated 
 
According to our account, people for whom being a Democrat or a Republican is more 
causally central are more likely vote with their party because they perceive acting in identity-
consistent ways as more congruent with who they are, compared to people for whom political 
affiliation is more causally peripheral. However, it also possible that the causal centrality 
measure is merely capturing differences in the strength of people’s preferences for the candidates 
or in people’s ideological positions.  
To examine this, we tested whether the effect of causal centrality was explained by 
differences in the participants’ satisfaction with the candidate nominated by their party and their 
political ideology. We added the ideology index and candidate satisfaction as additional 
predictors in the regression reported above. Not surprisingly, participants who reported greater 
satisfaction with their party’s candidate were more likely to vote with their party. More 
importantly, participants for whom being a Democrat or Republican was more causally central 
were more likely to vote with their party (B = .15, Wald χ2(1) = 6.99, p =..008), even controlling 
for satisfaction with the party’s candidate and ideology (see Table 2 for detailed regression 
results). This result suggests that even among people who disapproved of their party’s candidate, 
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those for whom political party was more causally central were more likely to nevertheless vote 
with their party than were people for whom political party was more causally peripheral. 
 
Table 2. 
 
Study 1 logistic regression predicting voting with political party (controlling for ideology and 
candidate satisfaction) 
 
Factor Beta SE Wald p 
Constant 6.85 1.17 34.04 <.001 
Political party causal centrality .15 .06 6.99 .008 
Total number of links -.01 .00 3.96 .047 
Political Party -1.15 .67 2.94 .086 
Survey version .54 .45 1.43 .232 
Satisfaction with candidate -.88 .18 24.88 <.001 
Ideology -.17 .18 .89 .346 
*Coding of variables is as follows 
Voting: 1 = did not vote with party, 2 = voted with party 
Political party: 1 = Democrat, 2 = Republican 
Survey version: 0 = experimenter-defined, 1 = self-generated 
Satisfaction: 1 = very glad party nominated candidate, 5 = wish party had nominated a different candidate 
Ideology:  1= extremely liberal, 7 = extremely conservative 
 
 
2.3 Discussion 
In Study 1, we found that people who believed that their political identity was causally 
connected to more aspects of their self-concept were more likely to vote with their party than 
those who believed that their political identity was causally connected to fewer aspects. We find 
that causal centrality relates not only to how people structure their self-concepts, as shown in 
prior literature (Chen et al., 2016), but informs their political behavior. These findings 
demonstrate that differences in causal centrality predict differences in voting behavior among 
members of a political party that are not explained by ideology or candidate satisfaction. 
Further, as this study was executed at a time when political identity was extremely 
salient, differences in voting behavior are unlikely to be explained by differences in how salient 
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the Democratic and Republican identities were. In contrast with past explorations of identity-
based behaviors that have focused on factors that make an identity more salient via priming, 
identity threat, or social distinctiveness (e.g., LeBoeuf et al., 2010; Oyserman, 2007; Oyserman, 
Fryberg, & Yoder, 2007, Reed II, 2004), we focus on internal representations of the self and 
examine identity-based choice from a new perspective. Further, this approach allows us to 
predict which people will act in identity-consistent ways even when they are in the same 
situation—a prediction that approaches to identity-based behaviors that focus on environmental 
factors cannot make. 
 
3. Study 2a 
 The primary goal of Studies 2a and 2b was to test whether of the relationship between 
causal centrality and political behavior extends to politically relevant aspects of the self-concept 
beyond political party. Our framework suggests that any causally central aspect of the self-
concept can predict political behavior if that identity is associated with political positions or 
actions via widely-shared norms. While much of the study of identity in political psychology and 
political science is focused on partisanship, scholars in this area of research have also noted that 
membership in other social categories can guide political thought, particularly if these social 
categories tend to be aligned with political parties (Mason, 2018). 
One example of a non-partisan aspect of identity that is often associated with political 
beliefs is that of national identity, with nationalistic appeals being used to motivate voters and 
promote policies around the world. In the United Kingdom, British and English national 
identities have long been associated with Eurosceptic attitudes (i.e., opposition to U.K. 
membership in the European Union; Hooghe & Marks, 2004). More recently, British/English 
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identity has been associated with support for the United Kingdom leaving the European Union 
(Brexit) (Hobolt, 2016).  
In the next study, we explore whether the causal centrality of national identity, among 
U.K. residents who consider themselves British or English, predicts support for and voting in 
favor of Brexit. As in Study 1, participants performed the “listing causal relationships” task and 
report political behavior (how they voted on the Brexit referendum and their current support for 
Brexit). As previous research has found that priming an identity influences attitudes and 
behaviors associated with those identities (LeBeouf et al., 2010; Reed II, 2004), in Study 2, we 
counterbalance the order of these two tasks to examine whether reminding people of their past 
behavior influences the causal centrality of the identity consistent with that behavior. The study 
methods were pre-registered (AsPredicted #10244) and full stimuli are provided on OSF. 
 
3.1 Method 
3.1.1 Participants. Two hundred fifty-three residents of the United Kingdom who considered 
themselves English or British in prior demographic surveys were recruited via Prolific in April of 
2018. Ten of these participants reported that they identified with a different national identity and 
were excluded from analysis, leaving a total sample of 243 participants (128 identifying as 
British and 115 identifying as English). 
3.1.2 Procedure. Participants completed two tasks in counterbalanced order: 1) a survey about 
their attitudes towards Brexit and, 2) a variant of the “listing causal relationships” task used in 
Study 1. In the survey, participants rated their support for Brexit on a scale of 1 (strongly 
support) to 5 (strongly oppose). They also reported whether or not they had voted in the United 
Kingdom European Union membership referendum in 2016 (the “Brexit referendum”) and which 
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policy they had voted for. Finally, they reported how they currently felt about the outcome of the 
referendum on a scale of 1 (totally unoptimistic) to 5 (totally optimistic). 
 The listing causal relationships task was the same as that used in Study 1 except that the 
features were modified to match how demographics are collected in the United Kingdom (e.g., 
the educational degrees were modified to match those used in the UK) and national identity was 
added to the set of features. As in Study 1, participants first answered questions about their 
demographics (gender, ethnicity, political party, religion, income category, and education level). 
Then, as in the self-generated version of the task from Study 1, participants listed eight aspects of 
their political identity in an open-ended manner. Participants then reported the causal 
relationships that existed between the features of the self-concepts in the “listing causal 
relationships” task as they did in Study 1. The order of features was randomized across 
participants (the order of features for any given participant remained consistent across trials). 
Finally, we measured the norms associated with national identity. Participants reported 
how likely they thought residents of the United Kingdom who primarily identified with each of 
the major geographic identities (English, British, European, Irish, Welsh, and Scottish) would be 
to support Brexit (1=very likely to support to 5=very likely to oppose). Participants then reported 
how much a change to their national identity would disrupt their identity on a scale of 0 (exactly 
the same person) to 100 (completely different person). 
3.2 Results 
3.2.1 Perceptions of support for Brexit (all UK geographic identities). The results of the 
perceptions questions confirm that the English and British identities are seen as more strongly 
associated with support for Brexit than the European identity. Participants expected that people 
who primarily identified as British or English would be significantly more likely to support 
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Brexit than people who primarily identified as European (support for Brexit is indicated by 
smaller numbers, MBritish = 2.8, MEnglish = 2.5, MEuropean = 4.2, t(252)s > 16.39, ps < .001). We did 
not have an a priori hypothesis for the other national identities (Irish, Welsh, and Scottish) but in 
exploratory analyses, for each participant, we averaged predicted support for Brexit ratings for 
British and English people and averaged predicted support for Brexit ratings for Irish, Welsh, 
and Scottish people. This analysis revealed that, on average, participants believed that British 
and English people were more likely to support Brexit than people from the other three identities 
(MAvgBritishEnglish = 2.64, MAvgAllOther = 3.45, t(252) = 16.39, p < .001). 
3.2.2 Causal centrality of national identity and task order. On average, participants reported that 
their national identity had 4.12 links to other features of their self-concept (4.12 links among 
participants who voted in the Brexit referendum). If reminding people of a behavior associated 
with their national identity (how they voted) influenced reports of the causal centrality of 
national identity (perhaps via cognitive dissonance), when the Brexit survey was before the 
causal relationships task—relative to those who did the Brexit survey after the causal 
relationships task—we would expect those who voted for Brexit to report greater centrality and 
those who voted against Brexit to report lower centrality. That is, we would expect an order × 
vote interaction. However, an ANOVA revealed no task order × vote interaction (F(1, 204) = 
0.19, p = .663) suggesting that task order did not influence perceived causal centrality of national 
identity.  We therefore collapse across task order in out subsequent analyses. 
3.2.3 Support for Brexit. We conducted a multiple regression predicting support for Brexit based 
on causal centrality of national identity, controlling for national identity category (English vs. 
British) and total number of links. The causal centrality of national identity was a significant 
predictor of support for Brexit (B = -.10, p < .001) such that people who viewed British or 
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English identity as more causally central were more likely to support Brexit. The total number of 
links reported was also significant predictor of support for Brexit such that people who reported 
more links were less likely to support Brexit. National identity category was not a significant 
predictor of support for Brexit (see Table 3 for detailed regression results). 
Table 3. 
 
Study 2a multiple regression predicting support for Brexit 
 
Factor Beta SE t p VIF 
Constant 3.02 .17 17.49 <.001  
National identity causal 
centrality 
-.10 .03 -3.83 <.001 1.50 
Total number of links .01 .00 4.35 < .001 1.52 
National Identity .28 .18 1.59 .113 1.00 
*Coding of variables is as follows 
Support for Brexit: 1 = strongly support, 5 = strongly oppose 
National Identity: 0 = English, 1 = British 
 
 Further, when task order (causal relationships task first vs. reporting attitudes and voting 
first) and the interaction between task order and causal centrality of national identity were added 
to the above model, no significant effects of order were found (Border = .08, p = .732, Binteraction = 
.002, p = .957). This suggests that that the relationship between causal centrality and support for 
Brexit was robust to task-order. 
3.2.4 Voting Behavior. The majority of both British and English participants reported that they 
had voted in the Brexit referendum (British: 87%; English: 84%, 208 participants voted). A 
minority of participants in our sample reported voting in favor of Brexit (British: 49%; English: 
37%).  
We ran a logistic regression predicting whether participants had voted in favor of Brexit 
based on the causal centrality of national identity, controlling for national identity (British vs. 
English) and the total number of links reported. As predicted, people who believed that their 
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national identity was more causally central were more likely to report having voted in favor of 
Brexit, compared with those who saw their British or English national identity as more causally 
peripheral (B = -.11, Wald χ2(1) = 6.55, p = .011). This regression also revealed no significant 
relationship between national identity and voting, and a significant relationship between total 
number of links reported and voting such that people who reported more links were less likely to 
vote in favor of Brexit (see Table 4 for detailed regression results). As in the regression for 
Brexit support, when task order and the interaction between task order and causal centrality of 
national identity were added to the above model, no significant differences in the findings by 
order were found (Border = -.369, p = .369, Binteraction = -.01, p = .920). 
Table 4. 
 
Study 2a logistic regression predicting voting for Brexit 
 
Factor Beta SE Wald p 
Constant -5.34 .31 3.03 .082 
National identity causal 
centrality 
-.11 .05 6.55 .011 
Total number of links .02 .00 12.45 < .001 
National Identity .40 .29 1.83 .176 
*Coding of variables is as follows 
Vote: 1 = in favor of Brexit, 2 = in opposition of Brexit 
National Identity: 0 = English, 1 = British 
 
3.3 Discussion 
The results of Study 2a replicate the results of Study 1 with a non-partisan identity, 
national identity. People who believed that their British or English identity was more causally 
central were more likely to support and vote for Brexit than those who identified with the same 
groups but believed that the national identity was more causally peripheral. Consistent with ideas 
from political science (e.g., Mason, 2018), our results suggest that a potentially wide range of 
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non-partisan social categories may be related to political decision making if political attitudes 
and behaviors become strongly associated with them. 
4. Study 2b 
In Study 2b, we again explore the relationship between the centrality of national identity 
and voting and support for Brexit. Study 2b provides both a direct replication of Study 2a and a 
more detailed exploration of the operationalization of causal centrality. Thus far, we have 
operationalized causal centrality based on the relational centrality hypothesis (Rehder & Hastie, 
2001), which suggests that a feature’s centrality is based on the number of direct causal 
relationships that it has regardless of whether the feature is a cause or effect. In contrast, the 
causal status hypothesis (Ahn et al., 2000) and its computational implementation, the 
dependency model (Sloman et al., 1998), suggest that a feature is central to the extent that it is 
the cause of many other features (either directly, or indirectly by causing a feature that causes 
many other features) and being an effect feature does not influence a feature’s causal centrality. 
Thus, the deeper a cause is in the causal chain, the more defining it will be of a concept (see 
Equation 1). 
As noted in the introduction, we have focused on the rational centrality hypothesis 
because previous research found that this model of causal centrality more consistently predicted 
identity judgments (Chen et al., 2016). However, the relative validity of the two models are still 
being explored (e.g., Hayes & Rehder, 2012; Rehder & Kim, 2010) in the categorization 
literature. Further, most of the work on causal centrality has been in the domain of categorization 
(or identity) judgments, while the current exploration focuses on behaviors and attitudes. So, in 
Study 2b, we examine whether causal centrality as calculated by the dependency model also 
predicts political behavior. 
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The dependency model is an iterative model in which, ci, the centrality of feature i, is 
determined (at each time step) by summing across the centrality of the concept’s other features 
(at time, t), cj,t, multiplied by how dependent each feature, j, is on feature i, dij: 
                                                           𝑐𝑖,𝑡+1 = ∑ 𝑑𝑖𝑗𝑐𝑗,𝑡𝑗 .                                                     (1) 
 
The implementation of the model is a repeated matrix multiplication that converges on a stable 
ranking within a small number of iterations (Sloman et al., 1998; Kim & Park, 2009). Here we 
follow the conventions of the ConceptBuilder software (Kim & Park, 2009) which was 
developed to allow researchers to easily calculate causal centrality via the dependency model. 
The software performs 15 iterations and sets the initial centrality of all features (at time 0) to 0.5. 
In order to explore this model in the political identity context, in Study 2b, we added a measure 
(adapted from the ConceptBuilder software and used in Chen et al., 2016) that captures 
participant beliefs about the strength of the causal relationships that they report (dij from 
Equation 1). 
Thus, the present study enables us to calculate causal centrality according to both the 
relational centrality hypothesis (as we have done in the prior studies, by summing the total 
number of causal relationships a feature participates in) and according to the dependency model. 
To avoid confusion between the two forms of causal centrality, we will continue to refer to the 
total number of links measure as causal centrality and the alternative dependency model measure 
as causal depth.  
Further, in Study 2b, we examine how defining of the self-concept national identity is to 
participants relative to other important features of the self-concept. As noted in the introduction, 
research on personal identity has debated the extent to which the features that are perceived as 
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defining the self-concept are consistent across individuals or are idiosyncratic. While most of this 
research has focused on individual-levels traits (like memories and moral qualities) being 
proposed as being defining of the self-concept, here we will examine how uniform perceptions of 
national identity are. In order to do so, for all features used in Study 2b, we adding a common 
measure of how defining a feature is for the self-concept—how much a change to the feature 
leads to the perception that an individual would be a different person after the change (Blok, 
Newman, & Rips, 2005; Chen et al., 2016; Strohminger & Nichols, 2014). The addition of this 
measure also allows us to re-test the finding that more causally central features are seen as more 
defining of the self-concept (Chen et al., 2016). The study methods were pre-registered 
(AsPredicted #17556) and full stimuli are provided on OSF. 
4.1 Method 
4.1.1 Participants. Two hundred fifty one residents of the United Kingdom who considered 
themselves English or British in prior demographic surveys were recruited via Prolific in 
December of 2018. Study 2a participants were not eligible to complete Study 2b. Six participants 
had to be dropped because JavaScript failed to launch and they were unable to see the features of 
their self-concept throughout the study. Fifteen participants reported that they identified with a 
different national identity than British or English and thirteen failed at least one attention check 
and were also excluded from analysis. After excluding these 34 participants, there were a total of 
217 participants (131 British, 86 English). Results were similar when we included participants 
who failed the attention check (see Appendix A).  
4.1.2 Procedure. As in Study 2a, participants completed two tasks (order counterbalanced): 1) a 
survey about their attitudes towards Brexit and, 2) the “listing causal relationships” task. The 
Brexit survey was identical to that used in Study 2a except that we did not include the question 
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about how hopeful they were about Brexit. The “listing causal relationships” task was the same 
as that used in Study 2a, except that the features were slightly modified (and the number of 
features was reduced from 20 to 16). First, we reduced the number of features of political 
identity that participants had to generate from eight to four as some participants commented that 
it was challenging to think of eight distinct features. Second, to further ensure that our results 
were not a result of the features we chose, we replaced the pre-selected features (childhood 
memories, personal life goals, friendships, personal values and principles, and personality) with 
self-reported features from categories of features found to be important to the self-concept in 
previous research (Chen et al., 2016; Strohminger & Nichols, 2014). Following the procedure of 
Chen et al. (2016, Study 2), in an open-ended manner, participants were asked to report the 
feature that was most important to who they are as individuals in each of the following 
categories: memories, goals and desires, personality traits, preferences, and moral qualities. 
 In order to obtain the data needed to calculate causal depth with the dependency model, 
participants were asked a follow-up question after each trial of the “listing causal relationships” 
task, in which they had to specify how strong they believed each causal relationship they had 
reported was on a scale of 1 to 3 (1 = weak, 2 = moderate, 3 = strong)1. As the addition of the 
strength ratings makes this task more complicated and tedious than the “listing causal 
relationships” task used in Studies 1 and 2a, following Chen et al. (2016), we added two 
attention check trials within the task and added a practice task in which, prior to performing the 
“listing causal relationships” task, participants practiced doing the task with an unrelated 
concept. 
                                                        
1 Due to a coding error, for one causal relationship (the 2nd feature causing the 9th feature), the 
follow-up strength question failed to appear. For participants reporting that the 2nd feature caused 
the 9th, the strength of this relationship was assigned the most common strength rating (3). 
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 After completing the Brexit survey and the “listing causal relationships” task, participants 
thought about being completely different on each feature used in the study, one at a time. They 
then reported how much they thought that each change would disrupt their self-concept on a 
scale of 0 (exactly the same person after the change) to 100 (completely different person after the 
change). Finally, we measured the norms associated with national identity using the same 
procedure used in Study 2a. 
4.2 Results 
4.2.1 Perceptions of support for Brexit (all UK geographic identities). As in Study 2a, the results 
of the perceptions data confirm that participants viewed the English and British identities as 
more strongly associated with support for Brexit than the European identity (greater support for 
Brexit is indicated by smaller numbers, MBritish = 3.0, MEnglish = 2.6, MEuropean = 4.3, ts(216) > 
14.69, ps < .001). Likewise, support for Brexit among British and English people was expected 
to be higher than among Irish, Welsh, and Scottish people, as in Study 2a (MAvgBritishEnglish = 2.8, 
MAvgAllOther = 3.6, t(216) = 11.53, p < .001). 
4.2.2 Causal centrality of national identity and task order. On average, participants reported that 
their national identity had 2.52 links to other features of their self-concept (2.57 links among 
participants who voted in the Brexit referendum). As in Study 2a, we found no significant task 
order × vote interaction (F(1,174) = 1.68, p = .196) suggesting that task order did not influence 
perceived causal centrality of national identity, and we collapse across task orders in our 
analyses. 
4.2.3 Support for Brexit. We conducted a multiple regression predicting support for Brexit based 
on causal centrality of national identity, controlling for national identity category (English vs. 
British) and total number of links. The causal centrality of national identity was a significant 
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predictor of support for Brexit (B = -.11, p = .010) such that people who viewed their British or 
English identity as more central were more likely to support Brexit. National identity category 
was also a significant predictor of support for Brexit. Participants who primarily identified as 
English were significantly more likely to support Brexit than those who primarily identified as 
British. Total number of links was not a significant predictor of support for Brexit (see Table 5 
for detailed regression results). 
Table 5. 
 
Study 2b multiple regression predicting support for Brexit 
 
Factor Beta SE t p VIF 
Constant 2.98 .20 15.01 <.001  
National identity causal 
centrality 
-.11 .04 -2.59 .010 1.75 
Total number of links .01 .01 1.57 .118 1.76 
National Identity .83 .20 4.14 <.001 1.01 
*Coding of variables is as follows 
Support for Brexit: 1 = strongly support, 5 = strongly oppose 
National Identity: 0 = English, 1 = British 
  
 Further, when task order (“listing causal relationships” task first vs. Brexit survey first) 
and the interaction between task order and causal centrality of national identity were added to the 
above model, no significant effects of order were found (Border = .31, p = .234, Binteraction = -.08, p 
= .238). This suggests that that the relationship between causal centrality and support for Brexit 
was similar for participants across task-order conditions. 
 We performed the same regression replacing causal centrality with causal depth 
(calculated with the dependency model and z-scored due to the large range). We found that there 
was no significant relationship between causal depth and support for Brexit (B = .11, p = .322), 
again controlling for national identity (a significant predictor of support for Brexit; B = .83, p < 
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.001) and the total number of links (not a significant predictor of support for Brexit; B = -.00, p = 
.567). 
4.2.4 Voting Behavior. The majority of both British and English participants reported that they 
had voted in the Brexit referendum (British: 78%; English: 85%, 178 participants voted). A 
minority of participants in our sample reported voting in favor of Brexit (British: 29%; English: 
48%). We ran a logistic regression predicting whether participants had voted in favor of Brexit 
based on the causal centrality of national identity, controlling for national identity (British vs. 
English) and the total number of links reported. As in Study 2a, people who believed that their 
national identity was more causally central were more likely to report having voted in favor of 
Brexit, compared with those who saw their British or English national identity as more causally 
peripheral (B = -.16, Wald χ2(1) = 4.61, p = .032). As in the regression predicting support for 
Brexit, there was also a significant relationship between national identity and voting (such that 
participants who primarily identified as English were more likely to have voted in favor of Brexit 
than those who primarily identified as British) and no significant relationship between total 
number of links reported and voting (see Table 6 for detailed regression results). When task 
order and the interaction between task order and causal centrality of national identity were added 
to the above model, no significant differences in the findings by order were found (Border = .542, 
p = .229, Binteraction = -.126, p = .265). 
Table 6. 
 
Study 2b logistic regression predicting voting for Brexit 
 
Factor Beta SE Wald p 
Constant -.08 .32 .07 .798 
National identity causal 
centrality 
-.16 .08 4.61 .032 
Total number of links .01 .01 .83 .362 
National Identity 1.28 .34 14.53 <.001 
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*Coding of variables is as follows 
Vote: 1 = in favor of Brexit, 2 = in opposition of Brexit 
National Identity: 0 = English, 1 = British 
 
 
The results of the dependency model analysis revealed that causal depth (z-scored) was 
not a significant predictor of voting behavior (B = .50, p = .811), controlling for national identity 
(B = 1.28, p < .001) and the total number of links (B = -.01, p = .191). 
4.2.5 Disruption to Self-Concept Analysis 
On average, a change to national identity was seen as moderately disruptive to the self-
concept (M = 46.97 on a 100-point scale with larger numbers indicating more disruption).  By 
way of comparison, change to participant-generated personality traits were the most disruptive 
(M = 61.17), while change to education level was least disruptive (M = 42.85). As can be seen in 
Figure 2, people varied widely in their ranking of how disruptive a change to national identity 
was relative to the other features examined in Study 2b. 
 
 
Fig 1. Histogram of national identity rank on disruption to self-concept rating (1 = change to 
national identity is seen as the least disruptive of all features, 16 = change to national identity is 
seen as the most disruptive, average rank is assigned to tied features).  
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 To examine the relationship between causal centrality of features and the amount of 
perceived disruption to the self-concept that a change to each feature would cause, for each 
participant we calculated the Spearman correlation between causal centrality and disruption to 
self-concept scores for the 16 features used in this experiment. A one-sample t-test revealed that 
the average Spearman correlation coefficient was significantly greater than 0, implying that 
changes to more causally central features were seen as more disruptive to the self-concept (mean 
rs = .14, t(212) = 4.86, p < .001, 95% CI [.082 .194]. 
 We performed the same analysis calculating causal centrality with the dependency model. 
Changes to more causally deep features were seen as more disruptive to identity (mean rs = .12, 
t(212) = 4.41, p < .001, 95% CI [.067 .175]. A paired t-test revealed that the average Spearman 
correlation coefficient did not differ between the two forms of causal centrality, (t(212) = 1.20, p 
= .231, 95% CI of the difference [-.046 .011]). 
To examine the relative impact of the two forms of causal centrality on disruption to 
identity scores, we regressed identity disruption ratings on both z-scored measures of causal 
centrality, separately for each subject, The results revealed that the mean regression coefficient 
for causal centrality was significantly positive (M = 3.27, t(212) = 3.71, p < .001, 95% CI = 1.54 
5.01]); however the mean regression coefficient for causal depth was not significant (M = .59, 
t(212) = .72, p = .471, 95% CI = [-1.02 2.19]). Thus, the causal depth measure does not appear to 
add predictive power to a simpler model of causal centrality that only includes the number of 
causal links. 
4.3 Discussion 
The results of Study 2b replicate the results of Study 2a, the causal centrality of national 
identity predicted voting behavior and support for Brexit among UK residents. An alternative 
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form of causal centrality, causal depth as calculated by the dependency model (Sloman et al., 
1998), in which features are more central to the extent that they are deeper in the causal chain 
(e.g., they cause many features that also cause many other features), was not predictive of voting 
behavior and support for Brexit. We also revisited the results of Studies 1 and 2a and tested a 
modified version of the dependency model (Sloman et al., 1998). As we do not have the data on 
relationship strength that is required by the dependency model, to calculate causal centrality with 
the dependency model we assigned all causal relationships the same strength. Consistent with the 
results Study 2b, we did not find that this version of causal centrality was a significant predictor 
of voting (Studies 1 and 2a) or attitudes towards Brexit (Study 2a) (see Appendix B for details). 
It is worth noting that since our measure of causal centrality counts being a cause of other 
features and being an effect of other feature as equal, one may wonder whether associative 
relationships would yield the same outcome. Causal centrality is based on the theory-based view 
of concepts (Murphy & Medin, 1985) which suggests that our concepts exist within our world 
knowledge; we not only know that features occur together in a concept (e.g., polar bears are 
white and live near snow) but also have lay theories about why feature go together (e.g., polar 
bears are white so they can blend in with the snow). Since (non-causal) associations do not 
provide any explanation for why features co-occur as causal relationships do, theoretically, 
associations would not hold the same privileged status in conceptual representation. Further, 
there is evidence that causal relationships are particularly important in our conceptual 
representations. People are more likely to recall that features are correlated when they can 
describe a causal relationship between them (e.g., summer shirts tend to have short sleeves 
because short sleeves allow one to stay cool in the summer) than when they cannot readily 
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explain why they would be correlated (e.g., shirts with buttons tend to have long sleeves, Ahn et 
al., 2002; Malt & Smith, 1984). 
In our own data, we find evidence for an asymmetry in how predictive the number of 
effects and causes an identity has is of political behavior. For each study, we simultaneously 
regressed our dependent measures on the number of causes and the number of effects that 
political or national identity had. We found that the number of causes political and national 
identity have (i.e., the number of things that the identity is an effect of) was more predictive of 
political thought and behavior than the number of effects an identity has (i.e., the number of 
other features that the identity is a cause of). (See Appendix D for details of these regressions.) 
In contrast to our exploration of voting and support for Brexit, we found that both the 
causal centrality and causal depth of a feature predict ratings of disruption to the self-concept 
resulting from a change to that feature. However, when both measures were used in a multiple 
regression predicting disruption to identity scores, causal depth did not add any predictive power 
beyond that of causal centrality (replicating findings in Chen et al. (2016). As one of the main 
differences between causal centrality and causal depth is that causal depth takes into account 
indirect, downstream effects of a feature while causal centrality does not, it is instructive that 
taking into account these downstream effects does not seem to add predictive power. Another 
main difference between the two models is that causal depth does not take into account the 
number of relationships in which the feature is an effect (i.e., the number of other features that 
caused it).  We test whether the relationship between causal centrality and disruption to the self-
concept is driven by the direct effects of a feature, but we do not find evidence for this 
interpretation. When disruption to the self-concept scores were simultaneously regressed on the 
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number of effects and the number of causes a feature had, both were significant predictors of 
disruption scores (see Appendix D Table D.6 for details). 
 Further, the results of the disruption to the self-concept analysis also revealed that there is 
great variance among people’s perceptions of how defining of the self-concept national identity 
is relative to other features of the self-concept (see Figure 2). This suggests that the importance 
of national identity to the self-concept is highly idiosyncratic and underscores the importance of 
understanding not only which type of features tend to be important but also the underlying 
idiosyncratic causal beliefs that make different features important to different people. 
In Studies 2a and 2b, we found that people who perceive their British or English national 
identity as more causally central are more like to have voted for and to support Brexit. As these 
results are correlational, it is, of course, possible that voting could influence the casual centrality 
of the identity studied in Studies 2a and 2b. However, the lack of task order effects in both 
studies suggests that this is not a key driver of our results. Specifically, if voting influences 
causal centrality (e.g., through some form of cognitive dissonance, Beasley & Joslyn 2001), one 
would expect that the order would matter. Specifically, making the past vote salient by asking 
participants to report their vote prior to reporting the causal centrality of national identity would 
strengthen the relationship between causal centrality and voting (compared to having participants 
report their vote after reporting causal centrality of national identity). We found no such 
interaction between causal centrality and task order. Further, we also found no evidence of task 
order effects on the number of links reported for national identity. That is, there was no evidence 
that having participants report how they voted in the Brexit referendum influenced the causal 
relationships they reported for their national identity suggesting that these types of subtle primes 
may not have a strong influence on perceptions of causal centrality. 
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Of course, this is not to say that identity-based behaviors cannot influence causal 
centrality. Theoretically, doing more activities associated with an identity should eventually 
make that identity more causally central—for example, if a person starts participating in a lot of 
Democratic Party activities, doing these activities would likely shape his or her interests, beliefs, 
and values, as well as relationships with other people, making the Democratic identity more 
causally central over time. How quickly perceptions of causal centrality change in response to 
such changes in behavior is an interesting question for future research.  
5.0 General Discussion 
We have proposed that some of the differences in people’s political attitudes and 
behaviors may be predicted by differences in their beliefs about how identities with associated 
norms for political behavior are related to other aspects of the self-concept. In three studies, we 
found that people who perceived their political party (Study 1) or national identity (Studies 2a 
and 2b) as more causally central were indeed more likely to vote in ways associated with the 
norms of the group than were other people who also identified with the same group but who saw 
the identity as relatively more casually peripheral. 
Further, we found that when causal centrality (causal depth) was calculated in accordance 
with another major theoretical model—the causal status hypothesis implemented with the 
dependency model (Sloman et al., 1998)—it did not predict differences in political attitudes and 
behavior. In our data, this measure yielded a small number of outliers. We conducted exploratory 
analysis and found that when controlling for outliers2, causal depth inconsistently predicted 
                                                        
2 We controlled for outliers two ways. First, we assigned all participants above the 95th percentile 
the causal depth score at the 95th percentile. Second, we ranked participants by their causal depth 
scores for political and national identity and used the rankings to predict political attitudes and 
behaviors. 
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voting and support for Brexit in Studies 2a and 2b (but was not predictive of voting in Study 1; 
see Appendix B for details). Thus, although the dependency model is the main implementation of 
the causal status hypothesis, it is only one possible implementation and additional research may 
be needed to identify the best way to operationalize the causal status hypothesis in the context of 
the self-concept and identity-based behaviors. However, even causal depth measures controlling 
for outliers did not predict political behavior and attitudes as consistently as causal centrality (the 
total number of causal links a feature has). Further, as noted in the discussion of Studies 2a and 
2b, we found evidence that political identity being an effect of other features is predictive of 
political attitudes and behavior. This is contrary to an assumption of the causal status hypothesis 
and the dependency model—that only being the cause of features, and not being the effect of 
features, influences causal depth.  
5.1 Possible mechanisms 
 While this exploration of causal centrality and identity-consistent behaviors is meant to 
be strictly descriptive, considering rational perspectives on identity-consistent behaviors may 
provide a useful framework in which to think about the mechanisms that may underlie our 
effects. Some economic models have incorporated identity into the utility function, suggesting 
that acting in identity-consistent ways leads to a gain in utility, while acting in identity-
inconsistent ways leads to disutility (e.g., in the form of anxiety or discomfort, Ackerlof & 
Kranton, 2000; 2010). It may be that when an identity is causally central, acting in identity-
consistent ways provides greater utility or that acting in identity-inconsistent ways provides 
greater disutility than when that identity is causally peripheral, thus, making our results 
consistent with this rational account of identity-based behaviors.  
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The exact mechanisms underlying the relationship between identity-based behaviors and 
(dis)utility remain a topic for future research. However, previous research suggests some 
possibilities. As some approaches to identity-based behaviors suggest that acting in identity-
consistent ways is a goal that can be activated by environments that make an identity salient, one 
such way that acting in identity-consistent ways may provide utility is via goal attainment 
(Oyserman 2007, 2009). The causal centrality of these identities may provide a measure of how 
much utility is yielded by attaining the goals associated with them. As Chen et al. (2016) found 
that changes to causally central features led to more anticipated disruption to the self-concept 
than changes to more peripheral ones, acting in identity-inconsistent ways may provide disutility 
via a feeling of disruption to one’s self-concept (i.e., feeling like one is not acting like him- or 
herself). However, mediation analyses using anticipated disruption to identity ratings for political 
and national identities yielded inconsistent results (see Appendix C for details). Further research 
into these possibilities could provide a better understanding of the mechanisms that underlie 
identity-consistent behaviors and of how our causal centrality approach to identity-consistent 
behavior may inform rational models of identity-consistent behavior. 
5.3 Feature weighting in concepts of categories vs. concepts of individuals 
The current exploration of causal centrality focuses on its relationship with behaviors. 
However, as discussed in the introduction, our approach to identity-consistent behaviors is rooted 
in the fact that causal centrality is critical to conceptual representation and to determining feature 
weights or importance in categorization decisions (Ahn et al., 2000; Rehder & Hastie, 2001). As 
with much work on concepts in cognitive psychology, the explorations of feature weights and 
causal centrality have focused on representations of categories (sets of items, e.g., the category of 
dogs, the category of people) rather than on representations of individuals (a single item or 
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exemplar, e.g., my pet dog, Ralph, my self-concept; but see Blok et al., 2005). Our work (and 
previous work; Chen et al., 2016) has examined causal centrality in the context of a concept of 
an individual, the self-concept. Examining feature weights in the domain of the representation of 
an individual raises questions about whether approaches to feature weighting and causal 
centrality developed for concepts of categories generalize to concepts of individuals. 
We have discussed two major theories of causal centrality from the conceptual 
representation literature: the relational centrality hypothesis (Rehder & Hastie, 2001), the causal 
status hypothesis (Ahn et al., 2000) and its computational implementation, the dependency 
model (Sloman, Ahn, & Love, 1998). There is a third approach to consider, the causal model 
theory (Rehder, 2003; Rehder & Kim, 2006). This model suggests that people represent the 
causal relationships between the features of a concept as probabilistic causal mechanisms. The 
items that are seen as most likely to be members of a category are those that possess the 
combination of features that are most likely to have been generated by the category’s underlying 
causal mechanism (i.e., Rehder’s, 2003, coherence effect). Applying causal model theory to the 
self-concept raises questions about whether the assumptions of this approach apply to the self-
concept and concepts of individuals, in general. This generative framework intuitively makes 
sense for categories where there are many exemplars for each category, each of which can have a 
different set of features (e.g., the bird category, in which your pet parakeet, the sparrow that 
comes to your birdfeeder, the ostrich you saw at the zoo, and the chicken in your refrigerator, are 
all exemplars). Applying the generative framework to a concept of an individual is less 
straightforward, since there is arguably only one exemplar. We have implicitly treated the 
relationships between features of the self-concept as deterministic—i.e., this set of relationships 
led to who I am. However, causal model theory assumes that these relationships are probabilistic. 
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To what extent people see the relationships of their self-concept as deterministic or probabilistic 
is a question for future research.  
Further, it may be that our concepts of individuals may be more similar to categories than 
is immediately obvious. This is particularly relevant in the case of the self-concept, as some 
psychological approaches in the personal identity literature conceptualize the self as being multi-
faceted, consistent of different “selves”—e.g., the possible selves, the ideal self (Markus & 
Nurius, 1986; Markus & Wurf, 1987), the past selves, the future selves (Wilson & Ross, 2001), 
and selves that are defined by roles (e.g., son, neighbor, husband, McConnell, 2011). This 
conceptualization of the self as multiple selves (rather than as a single exemplar) could be more 
aligned with a view of causal centrality where a generative process creates category members 
that have different features but share a common underlying causal structure.  
The self as multiple selves may also be compatible with previous approaches to feature 
weighting in categorization that are based on statistical information. As these approaches use 
category validity (the likelihood that an item in a category has the focal feature) and cue validity 
(the likelihood that an item is in a category, given that it has the focal feature) to determine 
feature weights (e.g., Kruschke, 1992, Rosch & Mervis, 1975), they assume a distribution of 
features across exemplars from which category and cue validity are calculated. For example, 
ALCOVE (Kruschke, 1992), a computational model of category learning, uses cue validity to 
allocate attention to features—i.e., to determine which features are important and should be 
attended to. Thus, the view that the self is comprised of multiple selves might provide a set of 
exemplars from which distributions of features could be calculated from. 
5.4 Future directions 
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 In the present studies, we examined the relationship between the causal centrality of 
political party or national identity, and direct expressions of the norms of those groups (voting 
and support for policies). However, prior research has also suggested that political identity plays 
a role in how people reason and process information. Political scientists and psychologists have 
demonstrated that political identity can distort beliefs and interpretations of novel information 
via motivated reasoning (Gaines et al., 2007; Taber & Lodge, 2006; Tappin, van der Leer, & 
McKay, 2017; Van Bavel & Pereria, 2018). Thus, a key question for future research is whether 
the present effects extend from direct behavior to information processing and belief formation, 
and whether causal centrality may also predict biases in such processes.  
Based on research which suggests that the norms of social groups drive identity-
consistent behaviors (e.g., Ackerlof & Kranton, 2000, 2010; LeBoeuf et al., 2010), whether 
causal centrality relates to belief formation may depend on whether the specific attitudes and 
beliefs are seen as norms of the group. Distortion of novel information seems more challenging 
to explain with a norms-based process, as it seems somewhat unlikely that there are strong 
identity-specific norms for biased information processing, as opposed to general norms for 
accuracy. Therefore, motivated reasoning and information processing may be less likely to be 
influenced by the causal centrality of a given identity. This remains an important question for 
future research. 
Further, causal centrality may provide insights on a related question: which norms of a 
social group are most likely to be followed by group members? A recent framework proposes 
that biases towards social groups that are based on features seen as causally central (as 
determined by the dependency model) lead to more robust biases than those based on features 
that are merely associated with the group (Del Pinal & Spaulding, 2018). Therefore, it may be 
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that beliefs about the causal structure of social categories also determine which group norms are 
seen as most central to the social category and most important to follow. 
Another key question for future research is how malleable the causal relationships 
between features of the self-concept are. Much of the work on causal centrality in conceptual 
representation has been done using artificial categories, in which these relationships can be 
manipulated. However, it unclear whether beliefs about relationships in familiar, knowledge-rich 
categories likewise represent a malleable constructed representation, or instead provide a stable 
basis for reasoning about the self-concept. Research on category-based reasoning has 
documented differences in causal beliefs and causal reasoning between novices and experts (e.g., 
Lopez et al., 1997; Medin et al., 1997; Proffitt et al., 2000) such that experts rely more on their 
extensive and fully developed causal knowledge.  
In the domain of their own self-concept, compared to other domains, people seem likely 
to resemble experts, with richer, more entrenched causal beliefs, particularly relative to artificial 
concepts. On the other hand, people who are relative novices to the political world may have less 
extensive causal beliefs about how their political identity is causally related to the other features 
of their self-concept. If that is the case, the casual centrality of political identity may be more 
malleable among these novices than among those more “expert” on their political identity. As a 
result, the way political novices are introduced to political identities may shape the centrality of 
their political identities, and ultimately, relate to how these identities predict behavior. Further, 
the motivation to see one’s self as a member of a social group may influence both whether 
people act in identity-consistent ways and how likely they are to update their causal beliefs as a 
result of these actions. 
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In the present studies, our main goal was to leverage the nature of the representation of 
the self-concept to better understand the relationship between political identity and political 
behavior. However, the relationship between political identity and political behavior is only one 
example of how identity is linked to behavior. Social psychologists and economists have 
suggested that a wide range of social categories drive various behaviors (e.g., Ackerlof & 
Kranton, 2000, 2010; Markus & Wurf, 1987). Accordingly, our framework has the potential to 
predict differences in propensity to act in the ways prescribed by the relevant norms among 
group members from a wide variety of social categories. A critical component of our framework 
is that political identity is interrelated with a wide range of other aspects of the self-concept that 
also participate in causal relationships with one another (and, thus, have their own causal 
centralities). Further, as people simultaneously belong to multiple social categories with 
potentially conflicting norms (e.g., the norms of one’s national identity could conflict with the 
norms of one’s political identity), our framework may have implications for understanding which 
social categories are more likely to prevail when such conflicts arise, and which identities may 
therefore moderate the role of political identities. 
5.5 Conclusion 
Our findings illustrate how theories about the nature of self-concept and conceptual 
representation can provide us with a deeper understanding of the relationship between political 
identity and political behavior. The causal centrality of political identity predicts which members 
of a political party are more or less likely to act in ways consistent with their political identity. 
Further, these results demonstrate an important expansion of the study of causal centrality, 
beyond behaviors directly involving categorization into downstream decision making and 
political behaviors motivated by category-associated norms. 
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